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Policing Strategies against Islamic Terrorism in the UK after 9/11: The 
Socio-Political Realities for British Muslims 
 
___________________ 
STEFANO BONINO 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the socio-political dimensions of the strategies that have 
been employed in the UK against Islamic terrorism following the attacks of 
9/11/2001 in the United States. The role that Muslims, as a suspect population, 
play must be contextualized within the socio-political framework of late 
modernity. This framework will be posited as a driver behind the increased 
isolation, exclusion and embitterment of Muslim communities in the UK. One 
of the main arguments proposed is a prompt for governments and counter-
terrorism forces to: address the drivers and ideological grounds on which 
radicalisation and terrorism pose a threat; tackle the socio-political 
grievances experienced by Muslims; and partner with and empower Muslim 
communities. The British multi-pronged counter-terrorism strategy will be 
explored in order to demonstrate that some soft measures aimed at de-
radicalising vulnerable individuals, marginalising extremists, removing the 
human capital and support for terrorist organisations and improving both the 
dialogue with and the integration of Muslim communities within wider society 
should be among the top priorities. Such measures would be essential in order 
to achieve durable results in fighting Islamic terrorism at the grassroots level. 
In following such an approach, Britain will also have to face the challenges 
posed by both plural Muslim identities and communities and the differing 
Islamic and Western values and aim at achieving full social integration of 
Muslims within the wider society. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The importance of understanding the processes behind governmental responses to Islamic 
terrorism and its counter-terrorism strategies is evident in the prominence that terrorist threats 
have acquired within Western societies after 9/11, at both the political and public level. 
Whatever the likelihood of a terrorist attack, from a sociological point of view it is clear that 
the culture of risk that characterises late modernity has placed an increased stress on Islamic 
terrorism per se, and an augmented strain is experienced by Muslims, who are regarded as a 
suspect population. A pervasive culture of risk and social insecurity have shaped Western 
socio-political Islamophobic and discriminating attitudes that cast shadow on Muslims and 
further their resentment, thus playing into the hands of radical and violent propaganda. 
This paper will examine the British Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) and the 
various policing strategies employed in combating Islamic terrorism. Two models of policing 
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will be identified: the ‘high policing’ or ‘hard power’ model and the ‘low policing’ or ‘soft 
power’ model. This paper will suggest that soft approaches rather than hard approaches could 
be fundamental in fighting Islamic terrorism at the grassroots level, both by defeating the 
socio-political grievances experienced by Muslims and the ideological grounds for 
radicalisation, adherence and support to terrorist combat doctrines. Furthermore, the 
employment of community policing strategies, partnerships between the police and Muslim 
communities, and the strengthening of networks of informal social control will be explored as 
potentially viable ways to both address social stigma and exclusion and empower 
communities. Some of the hindrances that hamper such strategies will also be mentioned. 
Combating radicalisation and terrorism raises various challenging issues, such as: 
governmental dispositions and policing strategies dealing with Muslims; the threat posed by 
Islamic terrorism; the multi-faceted and elusive dimensions of modern terrorist organisations; 
the complex nature of Muslim identities and communities; and the full integration of Muslim 
values within Western societies. All these issues will be explored within the socio-political 
framework of late modernity and will fit within the main argument, which is itself supportive 
of strategies aimed at addressing socio-political grievances, combating terrorist ideologies, 
and partnering with and empowering communities. 
 
The Folk Devils of Late Modernity 
 
In the last ten years Western societies have shown Muslim communities in a bad light, 
defined Muslim identities by their ‘religion’1 and deployed an “overlapping three-pronged 
strategy”2 and a set of contrasting policies that, at the same time, presumably aim to integrate 
Muslims, fight international terrorism and repress perpetrators of religious violence. This 
attitude towards Muslim communities has molded governmental agendas, policing methods 
and social dispositions. Undoubtedly, Muslims have emerged as the folk devils of late 
modernity; as Cohen
3
 would argue, nowadays Muslims play the role of suitable enemies, 
while Western societies play that of suitable victims. Muslims are not simply considered 
immigrants who are ‘non-persons,’ 4  or “threatening outcast[s],” 5  or people whose 
foreignness
6
 and Asianness
7
 is criminalised. They are also deemed responsible for the ‘crime’ 
of their religious identity, stigmatized
8
 and labelled as outsiders
9
 purely as a result of being 
Muslim. Studies found that visible markers of ‘Muslimness’ are connected with a rise in the 
probability of experiencing marginalization, racism and issues over access to employment,
10
 
as well as daily discrimination in the form of verbal and even physical assault and violence.
11
 
Islamophobia and prejudice against Muslims are broadly linked to the European 
progressive shift to the far right and socio-political discourses that consider Muslims as a 
security, economic, social and cultural threat.
12 Hellyer13 notes that in the UK Muslims were 
not protected by legal norms on religious discrimination until very recently, and opines that 
British Muslims have been portrayed as a ‘fifth column’ by society. The media have surely 
played an important role in spreading moral panics, furthering ideological racism, and 
promoting hostility towards and criminalisation of Muslims.
14
 The Commission on British 
Muslims and Islamophobia
15
 has made clear allegations of institutional Islamophobia. Some 
politicians, such as Jack Straw,
16
 have surely not eased inter-racial tensions or promoted 
social attitudes based on racial equality. Islamophobic attitudes have reached academia too. 
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This should raise particular concerns, given the educational and influential role that 
academics have on students. A vivid example of academic Islamophobia is offered by 
Sookhdeo’s popular book Understanding Islamic Terrorism: The Islamic Doctrine of War17 
which presents several misleading passages on the Islamic faith. Interviewed by Jackson,
18
 
Lambert states that his Muslim police colleagues “found part of it [i.e. Sookhdeo’s book] to 
be deeply offensive and Islamophobic”. Clearly, a widespread diffusion of Islamophobic 
attitudes against Muslims poses those risks that Goode and Ben-Yehuda
19
 have associated 
with moral panics, namely a potential change in the social fabric and the rise of a collective 
conscience that sets an absolute moral boundary between right and wrong, acceptable and not 
acceptable, normal and deviant. 
On the issue of anti-Muslim prejudice, the study conducted by Strabac and Listhaug
20
 
deserves some space. Employing data from 30 countries included in the 1999-2000 wave of 
the European Value Study, the authors note that the “aggregate level of anti-Muslim 
prejudice [is] significantly higher than the corresponding level of anti-immigrant prejudice in 
both Western and Eastern Europe.”21 This study is clearly highly time-specific, since it was 
conducted before 9/11 and 7/7; however, it shows a pattern that has surely worsened after the 
terrorist attacks on the American and British soils. Rana and Rosas
22
 posit that nowadays 
there is strong evidence that the terms ‘al-Qaeda’, ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and ‘Muslim’ 
are used interchangeably, thus furthering socio-political targeting and discrimination of 
Muslim communities. 
The terrorist attacks on the West have not only cast shadow on Muslim 
communities,
23
 but have also molded governmental anti-terror laws, policing strategies and 
societal attitudes that revolve around terrorism, risk and global insecurities. Thus, before 
exploring the British counter-terrorism strategies and measures and the impact that these have 
had on Muslim communities, the risk posed by terrorism will be briefly assessed, while the 
socio-political context of post-modern risk societies will be sketched in order to understand 
within what framework Muslims are confined and violence and terrorism take place. 
 
Living in Western Risk Societies: Terrorism, Violence, Insecurity and Social Exclusion 
 
The risk posed by terrorism is of a double-infinite nature, featuring both elements of 
catastrophe and elements of uncertainty.
24
 As Beck
25
 would argue, such a risk cannot be 
predicted since it is statistically unlikely and non-recurring. Moreover, the global micro-
structured dimension of new terrorist systems (al-Qaeda being the best example) adds another 
element of unpredictability and augmented uncertainty around the terrorist threat. In 
employing micro-structures – which were originally applied in the field of global financial 
markets– 26  in the analysis of new terrorist systems, Knorr Cetina 27  argues that terrorist 
organisations “do not exhibit institutional complexity but rather the asymmetries, un-
predictabilities and playfulness of complex (and dispersed) interaction patterns.” Thus, such 
systems are dispersed, micro-structured, temporally complex and unrelated to formal 
authorities. Expanding Goffman’s traditional face-to-face interaction order,28 Knorr Cetina29 
also argues that interactions between terrorist systems and networks are now played out in 
global domains. In fact, through ‘scopic’ methods and modern technological means, terrorist 
organisations, such as al-Qaeda, manage to obtain both internal global co-ordination – 
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projecting interests, activities and events to dispersed users in the same way – and external 
global communication – presenting the same messages and images to the public, irrespective 
of time and space. In such a way, the boundaries between the fictional, informational and 
mediated world and the real, material and natural world become difficult to detect, given the 
intangibility of virtual structures. Thus, terrorism gains the symbolic power of threatening 
people simply due to its existence as a threat, and can spread its ideologies on a global level 
in such a way that counter-terrorism must face the manifold and elusive dimensions 
associated with terrorism. Thus, multi-pronged strategies that may result in failure are often 
deployed. 
Against this background, preventative policies become the paradigm of a global risk 
society, which places a stress on the control of unmanageable bad future events (a terrorist 
attack being the most feared). Aradau and Van Munster posit that “the rationality of 
catastrophic risk translates into policies that actively seek to prevent situations from 
becoming catastrophic at some indefinite point in the future” 30 (emphasis in original). The 
socio-political attitude towards the risk posed by terrorism could fall within the adoption of 
precautionary risk policies which might tend to over-criminalise an entire population, as 
though all Muslims were terrorists or supporters of terrorism. As Ewald argues: 
The precautionary principle does not target all risk situations but only those 
marked by two principal features: a context of scientific uncertainty on the one 
hand and the possibility of serious and irreversible damage on the other.
31
  
‘Selling’ the risk of an always potential terrorist attack, due to elements of unpredictability 
and catastrophe, seems to be performed in a top-down manner, so that citizens can see it as 
the legitimate warning from a credible authority. This governmental activity of ‘selling’ 
panics and risk (through propaganda, the media, etc.) could influence social dispositions 
towards the targets of precautionary policies. However, as will be noted throughout this 
paper, the theoretical framework that any counter-terrorism strategy should focus its activities 
on is the engagement with communities in both policing partnership and self-policing (for 
example, through strengthened networks of informal social control) and the disruption of the 
ideological grounds (including the socio-economic grievances that hamper Muslims’ full 
integration within Western countries) on which terrorism and radicalisation pose. Labelling 
Muslims as inherently dangerous – dangerousness carries a moral category and thus, leads to 
stigma–32 promotes further alienation and could depict them as “threatening outcast[s].”33 In 
this sense, the darkest future scenario could picture Muslims as placed outside social 
structures and, thus, outside the state infrastructure of Western countries. In fact, as 
Aristotle
34
 would posit, an individual who has been isolated and given no society to live in, 
becomes no longer part of that state. 
As Mythen and Walklate
35
 suggest, post-modern societies “trace the connections 
between macro-social transformations and the rising cultural prevalence of risk”. As 
theorised especially by Giddens
36
 and Garland,
37
 this pervasive culture of risk has reached 
almost every strata of the population. In particular, Garland
38
 lies in line with Mythen and 
Walklate’s point of view and argues that changes and developments in the socio-political 
structures have constructed a notion of crime as a normal fact. Consumerism, capitalism, the 
advancement of the private security sector, ‘responsabilization’ strategies, and the decline of 
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welfare measures are some of the macro-social transformations that have increased feelings 
of precariousness which are experienced by ordinary citizens on a daily basis. What Garland 
calls “criminology of the other,”39 in depicting current socio-political tendencies to over-
criminalise and harshly punish delinquents as a response to a state of insecurity, can be 
applied to the description of the orientations that societies have displayed recently in treating 
Muslim communities. Nowadays, the hazard is that Muslims could be treated as “aliens [...] 
posing risks to be controlled rather than managed”40 or as those ‘usual suspects’ that McAra 
and McVie
41
 detected, in their broader longitudinal study on youth crime in Edinburgh, as 
disadvantaged individuals who are over-criminalised and over-targeted by the police, which 
act as a religious or class (but not a legal) subject. 
Modern social control goes hand in hand with a visible display of state power and 
toughness, in a way, as Foucault
42
 would argue, to reaffirm the state sovereignty. The culture 
of control and fear that post-modern societies have instilled in their citizens has taken the 
path of shaping “ontologically insecure individual[s]” 43  whose “docile bod[ies] may be 
subjected, used, transformed and improved.”44 Perceptions of stability are superimposed on 
uncertain identities emerging in post-modern societies.
45
 Social practices shape, orient and 
develop individual attitudes, actions and behaviours,
46
 while risk is the main tool employed 
by the political apparatus in order to govern social problems.
47
 As Ibrahim
48
 argues, the 
notion of risk is a key element of globalized societies and manifests its pervasiveness in the 
daily experiences of ordinary citizens. Against such background, it is not surprising that the 
risk posed by terrorism possesses symbolic and rhetorical features, while the statistically low 
likelihood associated to the possibility of a terrorist attack is often disregarded. In fact, 
“despite the attention it gets in the global media, terrorism is much rarer than most violent 
crime.”49  
Following all these arguments, terrorism can also fit into Melossi’s enlightening 
argument, according to which “controlling crime has often been but an instrument used in 
order to control society.”50  If the construction of risk is globally performed and locally 
experienced by ordinary citizens, the fighting of this risk, as Beck
51
 would argue, is devolved 
upon the state, for an Hobbesian reason – namely, because the state is the main and 
traditional provider of security. In order to reiterate their sovereignty, states have used crime 
as a main tool, along with several incapacitating and preventative measures that have been 
advanced all over the world, both at the national and local level.
52
 When also considering that 
the rhetoric of tough American socio-political policies (for example, ‘zero tolerance’ or 
‘broken windows’) aimed at fighting delinquency at the grassroots level has been advanced 
all over Europe,
53
 it is clear that the strain posed on delinquents and suspects (who do not 
always benefit from the legal right to be considered innocent until proven guilty) could 
become unbearable. Far from realizing Loader’s hope for a public philosophy of punishment 
grounded on penal moderation and the values of restraint,
54
 parsimony and dignity, the US 
strong penal culture portrayed by super-max prisons
55
 and the European iron fist in tackling 
immigration and criminalizing foreignness
56
 have produced a political and cultural retreat 
into fear, insecurity and suspicion. As Wacquant
57
 argues, the contemporary neo-liberal turn 
towards penalization both responds and feeds social (not criminal) insecurities, in a 
segregative manner in the United States and in a panoptic (through the police and the courts) 
fashion in Europe. The current liberal-paternalistic state portrayed by Wacquant is a dynamic 
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actor (and not just a repressive one) that produces effects on the social, political and 
bureaucratic spheres. State economic deregulation has promoted a shift from protective 
welfare measures to disciplinary measures. Such a system has generated social disorder and 
insecurities and penalization attitudes. An upsurge in penalization feeds and responds to both 
such social disorder and insecurities and a deficit of state legitimacy that the law-and-order 
right hand of the state must fill by reasserting the state sovereignty. 
In addition, Garland
58
 opines that such a disposition furthers the seclusion of the 
lowest strata of the population into misery and degradation. Such “a bulimic society where 
massive cultural inclusion is accompanied by systematic structural exclusion”59 (emphasis in 
original) promotes the strengthening of the highest classes’ supremacy and the exclusion of 
disadvantaged individuals (such as Muslims), who could resort to violence as a response to 
their strain
60
 or as a form of secondary deviance
61
 arising from stigmatisation and labelling. 
Including here the argument provided by Bourdieu and Passeron,
62
 in modern capitalist 
societies, the ruling classes maintain power by retaining a privilege over the cultural capital 
which preconditions what individuals will be able to obtain in life; disadvantaged and 
excluded people’s inequalities are then culturally reproduced by those educational and social 
institutions that aim to preserve the hegemonic class’ primacy over culture. The implications 
that such cultural primacy have on the micro-level must be carefully handled, but could it be 
posited that Muslims (here considered in an overly-simplistic way as a whole ethnic-religious 
minority) could fall within the disadvantaged class which is excluded from the hegemonic 
socio-cultural domain. This argument may be even stretched to affirm that Western Muslims 
could be currently experiencing a double cultural submission to both the particular 
hegemonic class power and the overarching Western social, cultural and political framework. 
In other words, it is a marginalisation within and submission to the dominant society ruled by 
the “morally lazy white middle class.”63 
Such is the socio-political framework within which Muslims play their role and from 
which counter-terrorism springs. Against such a background, the operational deployment of 
policing measures aimed at fighting Islamic terrorism will be explored also in terms of their 
impact on British Muslim communities. However, before embarking on this, it will be useful 
to outline the UK multi-pronged counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) upon which policing 
measures are based. 
 
CONTEST 
 
After the 9/11 attacks in the United States and the subsequent terrorist attacks in Madrid, 
London, and Glasgow, the securitization of European spaces and the fight against Islamic 
terrorism have been given priority in governmental agendas, while Muslim communities have 
come under close scrutiny in the UK, all over Europe and beyond.
64
 In dealing with the threat 
posed by Islamic terrorism, the UK has deployed a multi-faceted strategy called CONTEST 
(an acronym for ‘Counter-Terrorism Strategy’), which aims to ‘Pursue’, ‘Prevent, ‘Protect’ 
and ‘Prepare’ the country in the face of potential terrorist attacks. 65  Such a strategy is 
replicated at the European level, where the focus is placed on a long-term strategy aimed at 
combating home-based Islamic terrorism, unlike the U.S. short-term strategy based on 
winning the ‘war on terrorism’ abroad and targeting ‘rogue states’ involved in the training of 
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terrorists.
66
 The European Action Plan on Combating Terrorism
67
 was developed in order to 
tackle terrorism in a multi-pronged fashion that is aimed to ‘Prevent’, ‘Protect’, ‘Pursue’ and 
‘Respond’ to any terrorism threat posed within European borders. Such a strategy evidently 
resembles the British CONTEST. However, the E.U. is left with just some strategic decision-
making powers, since tactical and operational powers remain within national domains, due to 
both practical (efficiency and goal achievement) and symbolic (preservation of national 
security and defence identities) reasons.
68
 Basically, counter-terrorism intelligence remains 
and is performed predominantly at the national level,
69
 since it “falls under the mandate of 
national secret intelligence services.”70 Thus, the contours of the UK CONTEST strategy will 
now be outlined. 
 
Focus and Terrorist Threats 
 
The evolution of the British CONTEST strategy has passed through three stages: a first 
unpublished classified version (2003-2006); a second partly declassified version (2006-
2009); and a third almost fully declassified version (2009-now), which has been overseen by 
the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office and not by the Cabinet 
Office, as was the case for the first two stages.
71
 As mentioned in The United Kingdom’s 
Strategy for Countering International Terrorism - Annual Report (Home Office, 2010), there 
are four threats that the UK and its interests abroad face as a result of the activities of 
international terrorist groups. These four threats are: 
1) the al-Qaeda core leadership group; 
2) al-Qaeda affiliates; 
3) al-Qaeda inspired threats;  
4) other terrorist groups.72 
Arguably, the dimension of terrorism is confined to Islamic terrorism only, as there is no 
explicit mention of any other particular kind of terrorist group in the fourth point. In fact, if 
the fourth source of threat is not considered as a way to keep doors open to prospective and 
unexpected further sources of terrorism, but only represents an institutional façade aimed at 
preserving a ‘politically correct’ stance towards the Muslim world, then Islamic terrorism 
must be considered the true and only threat that the British government has deemed as such. 
Thus, this is a unique Islamic terrorist threat that comes from three inter-connected sources, 
the latter (al-Qaeda inspired terrorism) being the most dangerous and problematic, given the 
difficulties in detecting self-radicalised individuals who operate as small secret cells, often in 
partial or total isolation from the core command structure or other cells.
73
 
 
Factors Driving International Terrorism 
 
As Gregory
74
 notes, the four sources of threats mentioned were introduced by the 2009 
version of the CONTEST strategy, while the 2006 version simply focused on a general threat 
posed by radicalised individuals. However, both versions refer to religious justifications in 
committing acts of terrorism and CONTEST 2009 clearly states that “contemporary terrorist 
groups claim a religious justification for their actions and have a wide-ranging religious and 
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political agenda; they are no longer concerned with a single issue.”75 In considering the 
strategic factors that have driven international terrorism (namely, Islamic terrorism), the 
Home Office
76
 identified the following four: 
1) conflict and instability;  
2) ideology; 
3) technology; 
4) radicalization. 
 
Conflict and Instability 
 
This first factor is related to the conditions of socio-political uncertainty and instability, 
ongoing conflicts and global events involving Muslim communities
77
 in areas such as Iraq, 
Afghanistan, the Pakistan/Afghanistan border area, Yemen and Somalia.
78
 Exploring global 
conflicts involving Muslim countries and the particular situation of such areas is beyond the 
scope of this work, but the argument of this paper is that, in fighting the proliferation of 
extreme ideologies in terrorists’ home countries, driving national and European foreign 
policies towards the establishment of systems of liberal democracies and the acquisition of 
the support of public and political majorities may be more successful than the deployment of 
military troops and the engagement in prolonged wars. As Roberts
79
 argues, open wars 
produce little benefit to counter-terrorism at the best and painful tragedies to societies at the 
worst. Historically, there is no proven result that combating terrorism at its source through 
military interventions ultimately defeats it. On the contrary, such an aggressive strategy could 
revive imperialistic forces and spread the false idea that terrorism can be fully eradicated at 
the grassroots. It clearly emerges that the concept of attack as the best form of defence should 
be reconsidered. 
 
Ideology 
 
Ideology is a factor strictly interconnected with the last two drivers for terrorism, namely 
technology and radicalisation. In analysing al-Qaeda, its organisational structure can be 
effectively described as a “network of networks.”80 In fact, as previously mentioned, al-
Qaeda is a new terrorist organisation that is globally dispersed and operates through an 
horizontal structure. In this way, the core leadership provides inspirational and ideological 
prompts,
81
 but it is the affiliates’ duty to pursue al-Qaeda’s ideologies by carrying out 
terrorist attacks.
82
 Affiliation to al-Qaeda is based on ideological adherence, as this terrorist 
network is ready to welcome, accommodate and recognise individuals or groups willing to 
join the political cause and combat doctrine set by the al-Qaeda core leadership group.
83
 
Islamic terrorism in Europe is highly individualised, carried out by small groups, inspired by 
al-Qaeda ideology and lacks institutional ties to jihadist organisations.
84
 Al-Qaeda represents 
a sort of ‘brand’ or an ideology that could be sold as if it were a product. Furthermore, al-
Qaeda walks the path traced by the nineteenth century’s Muslim political antagonism to the 
West and exploits the rhetoric of the Crusaders, the Islamic faith and Muslim protest and 
politics to call the Muslim global community to arms in the fight against the Western 
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‘oppressors’.85  The concept of ‘ummah’ defines such a global Muslim community “that 
supersedes national or ethnic identities”86 and enhances the global reach of Islamic terrorism, 
as it can also rely on such a Muslim historical, cultural and ideological value. 
 
Technology 
 
In shaping a transnational Muslim identity, the element of ‘ummah’ is even stronger in the 
light of contemporary processes of globalisation
87
 and could further and sustain processes of 
radicalization and recruitment. The employment of modern means of technology has 
supported and quickened such processes. As previously mentioned, terrorist organisations can 
advance both internal global co-ordination and external global communication through virtual 
systems. According to the New York City Police Department (NYPD) Intelligence 
Division,
88
 the Internet plays a fundamental role throughout the process of radicalisation 
(mainly during the ‘Self-Identification phase’; ‘Indoctrination phase’; and ‘Jihadization 
phase’) of Islamic terrorists because: 
[The Internet,] with its thousands of extremist websites and chat-rooms, is a 
virtual incubator of its own. In fact, many of the extremists began their radical 
conversion while researching or just surfing in the cyber world.
89
 
The use of the Internet has also enabled terrorists to plan their attacks in detail. In fact:  
The Internet has been used extensively by the plotters of terrorist attacks in 
choosing targets, formulating the mode of attack, and acquiring the technical 
capability. The Internet’s broad and unrestricted access to information has 
provided attack planners with a variety of options and advice for launching an 
attack.
90
 
Without disregarding this further use of the Internet for terrorists’ scopes, the most delicate 
matter connected with the Internet seems to be its capacity to serve as a provider of 
fundamentalist ideologies and a radicalisation incubator on a global level. The ways in which 
the CONTEST strategy aims to control sources of radicalisation, such as the Internet, will be 
subsequently explored, when considering the preventative strategies employed by the British 
counter-terrorism within Muslim communities. Now, the focus will turn to the general issue 
of that radicalisation which sustains human capital, itself a vital element for terrorist 
organisations. 
 
Radicalization 
 
In analysing radicalization as a driver for Islamic terrorism, it is necessary to start by 
discussing whether it is possible to draw a profile of a ‘radicalized’ individual – namely, that 
kind of person who may be more likely to embrace the cause of Islamic terrorism. In The 
United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, the Home Office91 has 
not provided a specific profile for a potential Islamic terrorist. In the Report of the Official 
Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005,
92
 it is clearly stated that “what we 
know of previous extremists in the UK shows that there is not a consistent profile to help 
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identify who may be vulnerable to radicalisation.”93 In an analysis of the socio-economic 
background of the four plotters of the London terrorist attack, a unique and coherent picture 
does not emerge. Three out of four terrorists were second generation British citizens; some 
were educated, while some others were not; some were economically disadvantaged, while 
some others lived in normal economic conditions; some were apparently integrated into 
British society, while some others were not; some had committed petty crimes prior to the 
bombings in London, while some others were law-abiding citizens; some had minor trauma 
during their childhood, while some others had happy upbringings. In this sense, the House of 
Commons recognizes the concrete problem “for law enforcement agencies and local 
communities in identifying potential terrorists.”94 
 Such a position contrasts with Silber and Bhatt’s argument,95 which provides a clear 
profile of the alleged ‘candidate’ Islamic terrorist, according to the profiles of the terrorists 
and supporting individuals who were linked to five main Western-based plots and groups: 1) 
the 2004 Madrid attack; 2) the 2005 London attack; 3) the Amsterdam’s Hofstad Group; 4) 
the Toronto 18 Case; and 5) the Australia’s Operation Pendennis. According to Silber and 
Bhatt,
96
 the commonalities shared by many of the Islamist terrorists and supporters involved 
would lead to a picture of the ‘candidate’ terrorist at a pre-radicalization stage, as follows: 
- Sex: Male 
- Age: 18-35 
- Religion: Islam 
- Relationship with religion: recent convert, does not start as a fanatic 
- Ethnic background: mixed but often a second/ third generation in his home country 
- Place of residence or citizenship: Western country 
- Socio-economic class: middle-class 
- Education: from high school up to university 
- Life and job: unremarkable, ordinary 
- Criminal background: little or non-existent 
Such a figure should not be generalized, but it could be the closest profile of a self-
radicalized individual. In the work of Krueger and Malečková,97 a similar picture emerges. In 
fact, in drawing a parallel between terrorism and political violence, Krueger and Malečková 
challenge the assumption that terrorists feature a background of illiteracy and poverty. As a 
matter of fact, they argue that terrorists require an interest, commitment and effort to engage 
in politics, in order to sustain the ideological battle pursued by a terrorist organisation. For 
this reason: 
Well-educated, middle- or upper-class individuals are better suited to carry out 
acts of international terrorism than are impoverished illiterates because the 
terrorists must fit into a foreign environment to be successful.
98
 
Arguably, a fundamental factor that Muslims need to acquire during their process of 
radicalization and embracement of terrorist ideologies is a disposition towards violence and 
criminal activities. In the specific case of young Muslims, McVie and Wilthshire
99
 present 
various findings which, despite not being directly related to terrorism, draw attention to the 
question of violence and social exclusion as a prominent feature of  Western post-modern 
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societies. McVie and Wilthshire argue that an important driver towards violence should be 
connected with social marginalization and discrimination. In fact, conditions of alienation 
could generate a sense of injustice and grievance
100
 and, thus, further and speed up processes 
of radicalization. Also, McVie and Wilthshire found that being male and part of a criminal 
peer group could be a stronger predictor of engagement in illegal activities than religious 
affiliation. 
The important role played by social affiliation in the radicalization process is 
supported also by Bakker’s findings.101 In taking this argument to its extreme, the ‘paint-
balling hypothesis’ proposed by Githens-Mazer 102  posits that peer groups could be the 
primary cause for radicalization, through a process “beginning with a paintballing outing, and 
ending with a backpack full [of] explosives on the Tube.”103 In fact, following Sutherland’s 
differential association theory,
104
 criminal behaviour could be learned through exposure and 
social interaction with others, and a terrorist mindset could be promoted by “definitions 
favorable to violation of law over definitions unfavorable to violation of law.”105 Moreover, 
pressures towards deviance from the criminal group can overcome dominant dispositions to 
conform with institutions of formal control,
106
 and favour the creation of sub-cultures within 
micro-communities, in a similar way as happens within hardcore and street gangs.
107
 A fertile 
ground for such processes could be exemplified by prison, where opportunities for 
radicalization and recruitment are very high.
108
 Appropriate neutralisation techniques
109
 and 
moral disengagement strategies
110
 could be assimilated within fundamentalist groups and 
ground on alleged superior ideologies and divine goals. 
In a new study conducted for the British think-tank DEMOS, Bartlett, Birdwell and 
King
111
 draw a line between non-violent radicals and violent-radicals (or terrorists), noting 
that radical ideas do not always lead to violence. According to the authors, governments and 
counter-terrorism agencies should not target whole communities, but only those individuals 
prone to violent action and terrorism, and fight radical ideas with strong counter-arguments 
instead of bans. The spread of violent ideas is encapsulated in the notion of ‘social epidemic’, 
with reference to the impact that peer groups have in pressuring individuals towards violent 
radicalization. Also enriched by the romantic and counter-cultural appeal of al-Qaeda, the 
authors define the path from radicalization to violent action as characterised by “a culture of 
violence, in-group peer pressure, and an internal code of honour where violence can be a 
route to accruing status.”112 Clearly, radicalization presents itself as a complex jigsaw that 
will need further specific research to be solved. As of now, it should be noted that we have an 
out of focus picture of radicalization that needs to be brought into focus. 
Keeping such four drivers for terrorism in mind, the paper will now explore the 
operational deployment of the British counter-terrorism strategy. In analysing the two main 
policing models employed, it will be noted that measures aimed at tackling the human capital 
and ideological grounds, addressing the socio-political grievances behind radicalization and 
terrorist combat doctrines, and engaging communities in both partnerships with the police 
and self-policing could prove vital in shaping effective, though not too intrusive, policies. 
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The Operational Deployment of CONTEST 
 
In tracing the path followed by the ‘pursue’ and ‘prevent’ strands contained in the CONTEST 
strategy, two main overarching models could emerge as the most notable ways of performing 
such counter-terrorism activities on an operative level. 
 
The High Policing/Hard Power ‘Latin Model’  
 
The first strategy – exemplified by the ‘Latin model’ – has been fully and primarily embraced 
by the French government and focuses on harsh primary counter-terrorism measures based on 
preventative arrest and extradition
113
 and on a Foucauldian reaffirmation of state 
sovereignty.
114
 Such a ‘hard power’ exclusionary model, which is focused on low visible 
activities of intelligence, human and financial repression and disruption and the symbol of 
state power, could fit into Brodeur’s concept of ‘high policing’.115 It must be noted that in 
France, where such a system has been employed as the main counter-terrorism strategy, this 
“has been the source of fairly egregious violation of civil rights” and “risks creating 
dangerous social cleavages within French society through its excessive zeal and intrusiveness, 
particularly into the life of the French Arab community.” 116  In deploying massive anti-
terrorist legislation, surveillance and control
117
 the British government openly admitted that, 
in dealing with terrorist threats and extreme Islamism, “some of our counter-terrorist powers 
will be disproportionately experienced by people in the Muslim community.”118 
This highlights the eternal dilemma between the protection of the public and the 
respect for civil rights.
119
 On this topic, Ignatieff notes the struggle of governments when 
dealing with terrorism, public protection and civil rights and states that: 
The suppression of civil liberties, surveillance of individuals, targeted 
assassination, torture, and pre-emptive war put liberal commitments to dignity 
under such obvious strain, and the harms they entail are so serious, that, even 
if mandated by peremptory majority interest, they should only be spoken of in 
the language of evil.
120
 
In choosing the ‘lesser evil’ (the infringement of some civil liberties and rights) in order to 
prevent a terrorist attack and protect citizens, and due to the exceptional threat posed by such 
a ‘greater evil’, Ignatieff121 seems to condone some of the toughest ‘hard power’ counter-
terrorism measures. However, as Dannreuther
122
 argues, the necessity of addressing the needs 
of reassurance and conviction of both the domestic audience and the audience of those who 
could sympathise with the ideologies of terrorism must be kept in serious consideration. 
Dannreuther’s approach can in some way constitute an embryonic structure that resembles 
the multi-pronged system employed by the British CONTEST and will lead to further 
discussion on the ‘prevent’ strand, which will be linked to the so-called ‘British model’. On 
the one hand, the domestic audience expects offensive and defensive strategies that could 
reduce the impact and likelihood of a terrorist attack. Measures aimed at the targeting of 
terrorists (‘pursue’ strategies), along with terrorism deterrence, containment and pre-emption 
(a blend of ‘pursue and ‘prevent’ strategies) should go hand in hand with an enhanced 
protection of infrastructure, homeland security and civil defences, in order to ‘protect’ and 
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‘prepare’123 the nation against a terrorist attack. On the other hand, those communities who 
may sympathise or even support the terrorist cause need to be addressed and considered as 
well. In the words of Dannreuther: 
A key objective of counter-terrorism must be to undermine this support by 
delegitimizing the tactics of the terrorist organization and showing that there 
are legitimate, non-criminal ways to resolve the root causes behind popular 
alienation and disaffection.
124
 
This fundamental issue of tackling the support for terrorism will be examined later, within the 
discussion about the ‘low policing’ strand of CONTEST and those measures that are 
classified under the name of ‘prevent’ and are aimed at “stop[ping] people becoming 
terrorists or supporting violent extremism.”125 
 
Tackling the Financing of Terrorism 
 
Before moving on to an analysis of the ‘British Model’ based on preventative strategies, the 
particular approach aimed at disrupting financial support of terrorism should be briefly 
mentioned, as it could represent a particularly interesting measure, although problematic to 
put into practice. Falling within the ‘pursue’ strand, the fight against the financing of 
terrorism could be an effective strategy, mainly to combat global terrorism and impact on 
large terrorist organisations. As Levi
126
 notes, the financing of terrorism could be aimed at 
supporting: 1) global persuasion and diffusion of extreme interpretations of the Islamic 
doctrine; 2) terrorist infrastructures, such as terrorist training and recruitment processes; and 
3) the costs of a terrorist attack. However, Levi also argues that home-based attacks usually 
require low operational expenditure. Thus, when considering that the London bombings cost 
around one thousand pounds and the Madrid bombings a few thousand pounds,
127
 it is clear 
that the financial support for this kind of terrorist attack is modest and, thus, extremely 
difficult to detect. It therefore emerges that tackling the financing of terrorism could be 
successful with regard to global organisations, but may be less effective in impacting on self-
radicalised individuals who operate as small, local, secret, self-funded cells. The Home 
Office Treasury, the Home Office, the Serious Organised Crime Agency and the Foreign & 
Commonwealth Office
128
 jointly launched The Financial Challenge to Crime and Terrorism 
strategy aimed at a sort of partnership between the public and private sector in fighting the 
financial support of terrorism. In particular, the British strategy focuses on preventing funds 
being raised, disrupting the financing of core terrorist groups and affiliated cells, as well as 
the funding of radicalization.
129
 
If the aim of British counter-terrorism is to eradicate Islamic terrorism at the 
grassroots level, then the main focus should be on tackling the funding of radicalization. Thus, 
depriving terrorist organisations of human resources would achieve a huge impact on the 
overall fight against terrorism. As will be noted later, cutting human and ideological support 
can be a very effective way to combat terrorism. Thus, as well as tackling the socio-political 
causes of radicalization, disrupting the structures and networks behind the funding of 
radicalization could be an interesting strategy. However, this might also pass through the 
targeting of the funding of those important Islamic socio-religious centres (i.e. mosques) that 
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could act as radicalization incubators and encourage violence. Such a measure “would 
provoke a serious conflict with some Islamic countries (and a variety of religious ‘extremist’ 
groups within the West) and is far beyond current political doctrine.”130 Despite sounding 
very intriguing, the employment of financial disruption strategies in order to increase the 
success of anti-radicalization measures should be treated very carefully. Without ruling out 
the possibility of targeting centres that may act as radicalization incubators – while still 
keeping in mind that radicalizing ideologies are mostly spread through virtual, elusive 
systems on global levels – such a measure needs to be well-thought-out and deployed in an 
invisible way, in order not to achieve likely adverse consequences. Namely, a further 
indiscriminate targeting of Muslim communities’ cultural and religious values and symbols 
would cause more strained relations between Muslims and non-Muslims. Possibly, this is the 
most dramatic effect that high-policing counter-terrorism strategies could achieve.  
As will be examined in the next section, in order to increase the success of counter-
terrorism, policies aimed at lowering the sense of isolation, discrimination and targeting of 
Muslims and enhancing the integration of Muslim communities within British society, as 
well as strategies that directly impact terrorist ideologies, prove to be invaluable. 
 
The Low Policing/Soft Power ‘British Model’  
 
Preventative measures constitute the core of the second counter-terrorism strategy – 
exemplified by the ‘British model’. This model aims to employ community-based counter-
terrorism approaches to impact Muslim communities and improve communications, 
marginalize extremists and favour social integration.
131
 Such a counter-terrorism system can 
be considered a kind of ‘low policing’132 or a ‘soft power’ inclusionary model. Given the fact 
that most terrorist organizations aim principally at disrupting the national socio-political 
infrastructures and, subsequently – by exploiting governmental responses based on repressive 
measures – at further feeding terrorist ideologies and activities,133 such an inclusionary model 
undermines the rhetorical ground on which terrorist organizations rely. Furthermore, the 
British model utilises soft power techniques through “processes of persuasion, negotiation, 
and agenda setting” 134  and the employment of community policing, and assumes that 
communities can help to provide useful information and further intelligence goals. However, 
as Innes
135
 argues, soft policing as a persuasive form of social control could be limited by 
various inhibitors such as the fact that by empowering some communities the police should 
be more receptive to such communities’ demands and the need to “negotiate solutions to 
problems rather than enforce them.” 136  Also, preventative measures are not always 
community-based or employed through soft approaches, thus combining low policing with 
high policing. 
As argued at the beginning of the paper, the infrastructure of post-modern societies is 
built upon risk management, social insecurities and global threats. Preventative strategies 
seem to fit perfectly within the socio-political framework explored at the beginning of the 
paper and could possibly promote the targeting and discrimination of a whole population. For 
example, Pantazis and Pemberton
137
 state that the ‘terror of prevention’ is a “day-to-day 
harassment of Muslims through stop and search to high-profile police raid [that] has had a 
corrosive effect on the relations between Muslim communities and the police”138 and can 
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both further radicalization and hamper those counter-terrorism strategies that ground on a 
flow of information between the police and Muslim communities. Stop and search figures 
clearly show that all-catching preventative measures might have targeted whole ethnic 
communities. In England and Wales, police officers carried out 302% more stop and search 
operations against Asians in 2002-2003 than in 2001-2002.
139
 Similarly, British Transport 
Police’s figures show that, after the London bombings, in the period of time from 7th July 
2005 to 10
th
 August 2005, Asians were five times more likely to be stopped and searched 
than whites.
140
 Recently, Birmingham has experienced the first attempt to monitor and 
control a whole suspect population. More than 200 CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) were 
deployed in two neighbourhoods of the city, predominantly inhabited by Asians.
141
 Such a 
violation of civil and moral rights clearly obstructs the promotion of legitimacy and trust in 
policing activities, and is in line with a long history of troubled relations between ethnic 
minorities and law enforcement agencies
142
 since the end of the ‘golden age’.143 Arguably, 
such Orwellian dispositions that governments have displayed in developing Big Brother’s 
oriented and crime-preventative measures impact on augmenting fears of crime
144
 by 
“alerting citizens to risk and scattering the world with visible reminders of the threat of 
crime.”145 The rationale of the CONTEST ‘Prevent’ strand is understandable however it 
needs to be reformed. As Bartlett and Birdwell
146
 argue, preventative measures under 
CONTEST have been hampered by various ethical and practical problems. Preventative 
approaches are considered to have targeted the wrong people, alienated Muslims, furthered 
intercommunity tensions and jeopardized some initiatives that could promote community 
cohesion. The authors propose a new preventative approach that specifically focuses on those 
individuals who might be connected with violence and crime and engages non-violent radical 
ideas, not through a repressive culture grounded on bans but through a liberal and open 
culture that proposes strong counter-arguments to demolish radical ideas and propaganda. 
 
Tackling the Social-Political and Ideological Grounds for Terrorism 
 
The Home Office, in its Preventing Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Delivery,
147
 in dealing 
with the grievances that cause discontent and may fuel violent extremism, states that the UK 
is “already carrying out programmes domestically and internationally to address the 
underlying socio-economic factors that cause poverty and inequality” and “addressing 
perceived grievances through wider policies to promote equality and tackle racism and 
bullying.”148 This demonstrates that the UK, at least theoretically, seems to be deploying 
programmes aimed at combating the fuelling of the socio-political causes behind 
radicalization. In addition, CONTEST
149
 is particularly concerned with addressing grievances 
that may be exploited or created to justify terrorism or nurture radicalization. Such grievances 
include, for example, discrimination, racism, inequalities, under-employment, and other 
socio-economic factors. Furthermore, the Home Office notes that “actions taken in support of 
the Pursue agenda can be exploited by apologists for violence and indirectly facilitate 
radicalisation”150 (emphasis in original) This, in particular, poses the problem of conjugating 
strategies aimed at both pursuing and preventing terrorism.
151
 
Without downplaying the socio-political and ideological importance of advancing 
measures that try to stop terrorist attacks, it must be noted that such approaches have notable 
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drawbacks. In particular, as noted before, the fact that some cells operate on a local and secret 
basis and are constituted of self-funded, self-radicalized individuals, usually with no prior 
criminal history, combined with the relatively modest cost of bombings, makes it difficult for 
any counter-terrorism intelligence to detect suspicious activities and potential terrorist plots. 
Innes and Thiel’s argument should be added to this stance, as it confirms the ‘problem of 
quantity’, in terms of potential ‘candidate terrorists’ that the British counter-terrorism must 
face and the important shift towards prevention that is therefore required. In fact, Innes and 
Thiel
152
 note that the current central issue is how to handle multiple potential threats and deal 
with global ideologies as potentially embraced by Muslims in general, and not with well-
trained Islamic ‘soldiers’ who openly embrace the terrorist combat doctrine. Furthermore, 
Innes and Thiel also cast light on a recurring theme of this paper, namely the possible 
criminalisation of a whole population that could be seen as being composed of ‘potential 
suspects’. 
Against this background, the impact that policies aimed at addressing those 
grievances upon which terrorist ideologies and doctrine are grounded is prominent and, 
fortunately, partly recognised by the British government as well. Such attitude should also 
follow De Vries’s remark that counter-terrorism preventative strategies must be aimed at 
cutting any source of public support and radicalization within Muslim communities.
153
 As 
noted before, working on the human capital that terrorism requires to sustain its network and 
carry out its activities should be a top priority. In fact, such an approach is meant to primarily 
focus on the causes (ideologies and factors driving terrorism), instead of concerning itself 
only with the symptoms (terrorist activities), and improve the chances of reducing the 
proliferation of terrorist doctrines. 
In line with the socio-political framework of risk societies proposed in the first part of 
this paper, it is first necessary that governmental and social dispositions towards the problem 
of terrorism are taken away from the business of politics and rhetoric. Smelser interestingly 
argues that counter-terrorism policing “is conceptualized as integral to the rhetorical battle of 
symbols”154 and symbolically props up the state legitimacy so as to win the battle for the 
public and political trust and faith.
155
 The fight against terrorism cannot be a pretext for 
indiscriminately infringing individuals’ rights in order to pursue the common good. There is 
an already existing feeling that the “‘war against terror’ has been extremely profitable for 
many people.” 156  Also, there seems to be governmental dispositions towards terrorism 
grounded on the display of symbolic and rhetoric toughness, since, in the words of Lambert, 
“politicians and counterterrorism officials are certainly more comfortable when they can 
appear in the media being tough on terrorism.”157 Thus, it is time that Western governments 
started placing counter-terrorism activities and political attitudes towards terrorism in a less 
shadowy area, in order to write off the sensation of over-discrimination and undue targeting 
of particular communities. As argued by De Vries
158
 and Wilkinson,
159
 counter-terrorism 
should focus on some key points grounded on democracy and human rights, such as: the key 
role of the rule of law; the refusal of any kind of repression; the protection of human rights; 
the enhancement of systems of democratic accountability; and control and limit over special 
powers of law enforcement agencies. 
Without denying that the security of a nation should be placed ahead of any individual 
right, two considerations could emerge. First, the security of a nation is also a result of 
Page 17 of 34 
individuals’ law-abiding attitudes. The shaping of these attitudes through removal of socio-
political grounds for extreme violence is a first step towards the securitization of a whole 
country. Second, a concrete risk must be present, if individual liberties have to be limited. By 
comparing al-Qaeda to a ‘ticking bomb’ and noting the increasing array of emergency 
measures adopted to fight terrorism, Zedner
160
 proposes some requirements that should exist 
for governments to introduce intrusive, emergency measures. Such requirements are: a real, 
imminent and grave threat; firm evidence against one or more individuals; and the absence of 
less intrusive, more efficient, alternative measures. 
 
Community Policing: Integration and De-Radicalisation Goals 
 
In promoting integration and communication with Muslim communities, the employment of 
community policing could be extremely important, as this could represent an effective middle 
way between policing and social work. In dealing with ethnic minorities, the attempt of the 
Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) showed some promising results.
161
 In 
particular, the communities most in need of community policing activities displayed high 
involvement, which promises well for the future. As Innes
162
  notes, community policing 
strategies could achieve improved dialogue with communities and the reinforcement of 
informal social control. Furthermore, community policing can promote both reassurance and 
acceptance of the role of the police, thus lowering the tensions and counter-culture strands 
that may exist between problematic communities and the law enforcement agency. Security is 
posed in an acceptable and visible space and is performed by both the actors involved: the 
police, as the institutional representative, and the community, as the societal representative. 
In line with the low policing strand of CONTEST mentioned before, community policing 
activities could promote better dialogue; isolate extremists; and further social integration of 
Muslim within the wider society. 
Similarly, the institution of the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) displays a concrete, 
though particular, example of a community-based counterterrorism strategy employed within 
Muslim communities. The MCU, a small specialist police unit established in 2002 within the 
Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police and headed by Robert Lambert, utilizes values, 
practices and working methods typical of community-policing and inclusionary partnerships 
in the context of a Special Branch.
163
 In pulling together aspects of high policing and low 
policing and working towards the de-radicalization of Muslims both at risk of radicalization 
or already radicalized,
164
 the MCU empowered a small number of Salafi and Islamist groups 
in order to perform a blend of community and counter-terrorism work and influence those 
Muslims more vulnerable to the al-Qaeda propaganda.
165
 However, from Lambert’s 
perspective, empowering Muslims not only poses the problem of socio-political suspicion 
but, when coupled with the prospect of employing them as insiders in performing counter-
terrorism (both in preventing vulnerable individuals from radicalization and in driving 
radicalized people towards milder stances), could generate possible negative consequences 
within both Muslim communities and the mainstream society. Thus, such a strategy should 
not be completely ruled out, but needs refinement and a well-thought-out deployment in order 
to achieve the desired effect (i.e. reduction of radicalization) and avoid pitfalls.  
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However, driven by the notion of policing by consent and engaging with communities 
a partnership such as the one proposed by MCU can surely serve the purpose of building 
confidence and trust in Muslim communities and reassurance that Muslims are not a suspect 
population.
166
 In their work, Bartlett, Birdwell and King
167
 suggest that local de-radicalization 
should be enforced through partnership with both non-violent radicals and non-religious 
leaders (such as teachers, social workers and sport caches) who know the community and 
have a street credibility that can dissuade Muslims from violent radical ideas. Interviewed by 
Jackson, Lambert brilliantly advocates for partnership by arguing that: 
When torture is replaced by trust building you have the basis of a solid 
partnership that can reduce the impact of al-Qaida propaganda in the 
communities where it seeks recruits and supporters. It has also the potential to 
address the real root causes of terrorism and provide viable alternatives for 
young people that are drawn towards it.
168
 
Another interesting strategy is the devolution of Muslims’ policing to Muslim families and 
social networks. As Lowe and Innes
169
 argue, by strengthening networks of informal social 
control, Muslim communities could operate a sort of self-policing. However, the authors 
argue that self-policing has become less effective, since younger individuals have loosened 
their connections with social networks and the culture of first generation immigrants’ 
countries. Mixed with racial or religious discrimination, a loss of informal social control 
could lead young Muslims to a lack of social identity. This clearly leads to the necessity of 
furthering the integration and identity construction of Muslims living within Western 
societies. 
Partnerships with communities and the promotion of self-policing could be obstructed 
by Muslim communities themselves. Saggar
170
 challenges assumptions which argue that, 
most of the time Muslims do not possess information about terrorist ideologies, aims and 
plans.
171
 As Bartlett, Birdwell and King
172
 note, radicals and community leaders usually have 
a clear knowledge of what happens within the community (this being a sort of internal 
intelligence) and argue that Muslim communities may produce a strong moral infrastructure 
of tacit support or sympathy towards violence that hampers the efforts of those engaged in the 
diffusion of moderate ideas and partnership with policing bodies. Saggar
173
 openly claims 
that Muslim communities could provide terrorist groups with tacit support. This is not only 
logistical support (accommodation, funds, transport, privileged information about potential 
targets, expertise in weapons and firearms, etc.), but is also support “conveyed through 
shared ideas and values that have the effect of turning a blind eye to those engaged in the 
organization and delivery of violence.”174 This attitude is not so rare within tight communities. 
As discovered by Horowitz
175
 in a study conducted within a Chicago Chicano community, 
“non-gang community residents, but not outsiders, manage to co-exist successfully with 
violent gangs.”176 From Horowitz’ prospective, violence is in some way negotiated and, as 
long as it is kept out of the community and directed towards outsiders, it can be tolerated and 
placed within a cultural framework of cohesion and pride that allows community members to 
passively support it. Although partnerships with and empowerment of Muslim communities 
are problematic per se, such measures are just part of an overall strategy aimed at tackling the 
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ideological grounds for terrorism, integrating Muslims within the Western social fabric and 
reducing the burden of social stigma and exclusion that fall on Muslims’ shoulders.  
 
Negotiating Complexities: Muslim Communities and Identities in the West 
 
The idea of an Islamic bond of faith that could provide unconditional solidarity and support 
clearly calls into question the identity of Muslims as a global community and the values on 
which Western and Islamic societies are grounded. As Hellyer
177
 notes, Muslim political 
identities as grounded on religion are in clear contrast with European secularism. This is 
particularly evident in countries such as France, where tension over Islamic symbols (for 
example, burqa-style veils) has been a longstanding issue.
178
 Furthermore, in the process of 
Muslim integration, European countries have experienced their Western multiculturalism 
stretching towards an excessive liberalism and a tension between privacy rights and national 
security.
179
 As an example of European multiculturalism, the UK has a long-standing 
tradition as a guest-country for religious movements and, especially in the 1990s, gave 
asylum to Islamic radical preachers and activists who arrived “fresh from the politically 
repressive societies of the Muslim world.”180 However, such a policy of openness must now 
deal with its unintended consequences. The massive immigration of Muslims within the UK 
and European borders, as an unplanned result of guest-worker exchanges after World War II, 
has caused the isolation of Muslim communities from mainstream society.
181
 As highlighted 
by the Brixton riots and the Rushdie protests, multiculturalism has been contested in its 
incapacity to both grant minorities political equality in relation to the state,
182
 and address 
socio-economic marginalization. As Brighton argues, racial segregation has molded “a multi-
ethnic Britain composed of ‘communities’ without a ‘meta-community’ [which should be 
laden with values and identities in order to provide a shared communal framework] to tie 
them together.”183 
Although the concept of ‘ummah’ works as a bonding and solidarity tool, Muslims in 
Europe and in the UK do not constitute a monolithic group. Roy
184
 brilliantly illustrates the 
case by arguing that Muslims in the West have usually paid lip service to the ‘ummah’ idea, 
but remain committed to communities in a Western manner on a daily basis. The authors 
grounds his arguments on a two-leveled community: the universal, global and ideal 
community of all Muslims as based on the notion of ‘ummah’; and the local or national 
congregations of Muslims framed within the socio-legal structure of society. Islam surely is a 
‘badge of identity’ for European and British Muslims,185 but studies186 show that Muslims’ 
religious identities go hand in hand with their national identities. Arguably, most Muslims 
cling to multiple identities. Clearly, the daily negotiation of identity and sense of community 
intersect with the ontological complexities featuring the conceptual understanding of what a 
Muslim is expected to be. One could argue that Muslims (particularly in the case of older 
generations) might choose to create micro-communities as a way of reiterating their cultural 
values. This would be bolstered by the fact that immigration generally features a tendency 
shared by migrants to reproduce their socio-cultural patterns in the new setting, in order to 
preserve their identities and sense of nationhood.
187
 Such a cultural and spatial retreat would 
be triggered and promoted by the current Western “penal discourse about immigrant crime 
[which] can be seen as a symbolic protection of the national from the threatening foreign 
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element.”188 In the case of Muslims, this isolationist process could also be grounded on and 
further their sense of ‘ummah’ – a global Islamic community, which expands the traditional 
notion of community as a “cluster of values: solidarity, reciprocity, mutuality, connection, 
care, sharing.”189 However, such an argument is overly-simplistic and does not account for 
the complexities and pluralities of Muslim communities. Although the ‘ummah’ is a powerful 
tool both in terms of cultural and identity reassurance and for the interests of terrorist 
propaganda, some Muslims are aware of differences and diversity within the global Muslim 
community and do not shape their daily experiences and cultural negotiations on the 
‘ummah’. 190  This can be particularly true for those many second and third generation 
European and British Muslims who have been ‘Westernized’ and might be struggling 
between their multiple identities and cultural influences. 
According to Hellyer,
191
 second and third generation British Muslims have 
experienced an aggravated sense of isolation and alienation. In fact, the author claims that the 
contrasting requirements set by family sub-cultures and mainstream values, the lack of 
indigenous religious authorities, and socio-political Islamophobic dispositions have deepened 
the conditions of social exclusion and victim-hood of Muslims. This further problematizes 
the already difficult conditions of ethnic minority populations who usually have to face hard 
living conditions – or, as Young192 would say, they have to cope with both misrecognition 
and relative deprivation – and are victim of under-protection and over-control.193 The global 
picture of Muslim identities and communities is a complex one and calls into examination the 
various characteristics and requirements of ethnically and culturally different sets of 
individuals. It is clear that Western governments must endeavour to address those social, 
political and cultural issues that hamper the full integration of Muslims and further alienation, 
isolation and discrimination, which are potential factors for embitterment and radicalization 
and must be tackled by effective social policies and counter-terrorism strategies also aimed at 
reducing the proliferation of extreme and terrorist ideologies. 
 
The Challenging Path Towards Social Inclusion 
 
As noted throughout this paper, in dealing with Muslim communities and the threat posed by 
Islamic terrorism, the UK should first trace a path aimed at removing the ideological grounds 
for extreme violence. In recognising the differences in terms of history, tradition, legal and 
political systems and cultural values between European and Islamic countries, the UK is also 
required to bridge this large gap. Bridging such a gap would help show a more open and 
welcoming stance towards the social inclusion of Muslims within British society at the 
political, economic and social level. This could be effective in addressing the grievances 
currently faced by (British) Muslims. However, the UK should not override its solid 
European and Western roots. In particular, such roots are reminders that maintaining the 
basic assumption set by the social contract–194 in particular, the state’s authority over the 
governance of law and social order on behalf of its citizens – as the common ground upon 
which Western democracies are based is fundamental. In this sense, the requirements of some 
British Muslim leaders for legal duality and the application of shari’ah (Islamic law) in 
private law,
195
 or in the resolution of any dispute, seems to clash with the preservation of 
Western identities and socio-political cohesion. Thus, it emerges that the path towards 
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integration, recognition and respect for Muslim minorities will be extremely challenging. 
Along with the issues mentioned, the outcomes of different Western integration policies have 
proved to be, at times, paradoxical. For example, as Joppke notes, in recognising the limit of 
the British integration policies: 
Considering that, in the dreaded ‘Jacobin state’ across the Channel, which did 
much less on the ‘respect and recognition’ front and instead prescribed one-
size-fits-all citoyenneteé on its Muslim minority, the non-Muslim majority and 
the Muslim minority held equally benign views of one another, one might take 
this as a failure of British multiculturalism and a success of French 
Republicanism.
196
 (Emphasis in original) 
In this sense, the British effort to further the integration of Muslims within mainstream 
society should both recognise its limits
197
 and show openness towards the introduction of new 
policies. For example, Angenendt
198
 proposes four different policies that could advance the 
integration of Muslims within European countries. Although state neutrality, legal pluralism 
and group-based autonomy for national or regional minorities could be not easily feasible, the 
idea of granting special rights to minority groups as a way to recognize their cultural 
specificity seem to be an interesting one. At least, it shows that something could be done in 
order to move forward from the status quo. However, along with such approaches, it would 
also be suggested that Muslims are fully educated about those Western values on which 
European democracies are grounded, and always be reminded of the need to conform to such 
values, as a precondition for complete and mutual social integration. Such a process could be 
more easily carried out with second and third generation Muslims, although it must be kept in 
mind that family sub-cultures, as instilled by first generation Muslims, could contrast with the 
values set by the mainstream society and aggravate the social exclusion experienced by 
second/third generation Muslims.
199
 In this sense, a global approach that is performed by 
various social and institutional actors and focused on mutual understandings of the different 
historical, social and political frameworks on which Western and Islamic societies work 
could be implemented and may have some chance of success. 
 Such a global approach should take into consideration the inevitable expansion of 
Muslim communities or ‘Islamization’ of Europe. As Savage200 notes, Muslims have a birth 
rate three times higher than non-Muslims and have reinforced a demographic panic spreading 
in Western societies. Sendagorta,
201
 borrowing Yassin’s concept of ‘alternation of 
civilizations’,202 takes this matter to an extreme by arguing that “the vast difference in the 
birth rate is thus interpreted as heralding a new cycle in history, one in which Europe’s 
faltering civilization gives way to a flourishing young Islamic civilization.”203 The picture 
may not be so gloomy, but, as Taspinar
204
 argues, such a fast growth will surely enable 
Muslims to have important political weight within European countries. Acknowledging the 
inevitability of such a global and globalizing process should not be seen as a state failure or 
the passive acceptance of the Islamization of the West. On the contrary, awareness of the 
changes in our daily lives and realities would allow governments to mold what Taspinar
205
 
defines as a moderate Euro-Islam driven by a sound political integration of European 
Muslims. Hopefully, integration will be the new mantra that replaces the word terrorism in 
socio-political discourses concerning Muslims. The impact that current counter-terrorism 
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strategies can have on Muslims are not just restricted to the fight against terrorism. In 
combining counter-terrorism goals with the reduction of Muslim alienation, those strategies 
that aim at fighting terrorist and radicalising ideologies and addressing those socio-political 
grievances on which Muslim embitterment is based could prove fundamental. Also, those soft 
approaches that seek a partnership between the law enforcement agency and Muslims could 
pave the way for the empowerment of Muslim communities, thus fighting social stigma and 
exclusion, giving voice to communities and promoting equality within difference. In such a 
way, the strengthening of networks of informal social control and the promotion of Muslims’ 
self-policing could find a more stable dimension within a social fabric which would not be 
impregnated with resentment, extremism and a culture of opposition, which all work towards 
the fueling of radicalization and the clash between Muslim communities and mainstream 
society. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has outlined the manifold issues that the UK, as a European country, has to face in 
dealing with the threat posed by Islamic terrorism. As noted, the socio-political framework 
that features post-modern societies is grounded on a pervasive culture of risk. Along with the 
global, multiform and dynamic elements that feature new terrorist organisations, such as al-
Qaeda, such a culture of risk has shaped governmental and social dispositions that usually 
overemphasise the threat posed by terrorist attacks and over-criminalise Muslims, who 
experience social, political and cultural discrimination and exclusion and, as victims of both 
Islamophobia and the Western penal culture, are considered as suspects or potential terrorists. 
The UK has developed a multi-pronged counter-terrorism strategy that aims at tackling 
different causes and symptoms of terrorism. Among the factors driving international 
terrorism, it must be noted that ideology, technology and radicalisation are three 
interconnected elements that could give birth to new home-based terrorists. Thus, the 
employment of soft approaches aimed at combating and preventing radicalisation should be 
given priority over ‘hard power’ approaches, which could further the isolation, embitterment 
and targeting of Muslims and, in turn, play into the hands of terrorists and recruiters. In 
impacting on the human capital needed by terrorist organisations, tackling the financing of 
terrorism and the funding of radicalization could be considered, but must be handled very 
carefully. 
The preventative approach as a whole could target whole communities, however those 
well-conceived, visible, ‘soft power’ strategies aimed at fighting terrorism at the grassroots 
level should be given priority. Such strategies need to focus on the socio-political grievances 
experienced by socially excluded and embittered Muslims and the rhetorical, symbolical and 
ideological ground on which terrorism is based. If their intrinsic problems were to be fixed, 
partnership with and empowerment of Muslim communities, as well as the strengthening of 
networks of informal social control, could prove decisive in contrasting both radicalization 
and social exclusion and facilitating the integration of Muslims within the social fabric. 
Awareness of Muslim plural identities and communities is fundamental in understanding the 
various audiences to which governmental policies and policing strategies will have to refer to. 
A mutual understanding of the different values built in Western and Islamic identities would 
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help tackle the problems involved in integrating Muslims within Western societies. In 
conclusion, the employment of low policing strategies and the drafting of governmental 
policies aimed at tackling terrorism human capital and addressing the socio-political and 
ideological issues behind radicalisation, adherence and support to terrorist combat doctrine 
could be extremely helpful, but needs to go hand in hand with a well-thought-out parallel 
work that empowers communities, grasps the complexities of Muslim identities, and furthers 
both the mutual acceptance of diversity in terms of tradition, religion, ideologies and so on 
and the coexistence of Islamic values with Western ones within Western  societies. 
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